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Introduction
Cyprus is the only EU member state which is de facto divided into two parts. Un-
doubtedly, it is one of the most serious political dilemmas facing EU politicians at the
very beginning of the 21st Century. The situation has remained unchanged since July
1974 when Turkish troops landed on the island in response to the Greek coup d’etat.1
The division is a direct consequence of the military operation which led to ethnic sepa-
ration. The Turkish army remained in Cyprus in order to ensure security of Turkish
Cypriot community. As a consequence of the 1974 events, Greek Cypriots were forced
to settle in the south while Turkish Cypriots living there had no choice but to move to
the northern part of the island.
Greek Cypriots define the military operation of 1974 as an act of aggression and oc-
cupation while Turkish Cypriots use the term Cyprus Peace Operation.2 It is only one
from among many other differences which divide people along the armistice line. Nev-
ertheless, international community has endeavoured to resolve the dispute since 1974.
Number of initiatives, mostly under UN auspices, had been presented, however, the
Annan Plan and the referenda of April 2004 seemed to be the best ever chance for
a comprehensive settlement. Potential participation of a federal United Cyprus Repub-
lic in the process of European integration could have determined the success of the lat-
est UN initiative. It was for certain the best opportunity to settle the dispute and unite
two Cypriot communities within EU framework. However, it did not happen due to an
overwhelming Greek Cypriot ‘no’expressed in the referendum. ‘Yes’of Turkish Cypri-
ots was certainly not enough to implement the plan.
As a consequence, the European Union was forced to acknowledge the results and
find a way out of the complicated situation. The Republic of Cyprus joined the EU on
1 May 2004. Although de iure the whole Cypriot territory constitutes a part of EU terri-
1 It should be emphasized that according to Turkish Cypriots, the Cyprus dispute dates back to
1963, namely the actual disintegration of the Republic of Cyprus.
2 For more details on the military operation and its consequences see: M. A. Birand, 30 Hot
Days, Nicosia 1985; G. Clerides, Cyprus: My Deposition, Vol. 4, Nicosia 1992; V. Coufoudakis, Cy-
prus and International Politics, Nicosia 2007; C. Hitchens, Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Otto-
mans to Kissinger, London 2002; S. Ismail, Cyprus Peace Operation: Reasons – Development
– Consequences, Nicosia 2000; F. Mirbagheri, Cyprus and International Peacemaking, London 1998;
P. Osiewicz, Pokojowa regulacja kwestii cypryjskiej, Toruñ 2008; O. P. Richmond, Mediating in Cy-
prus: The Cypriot Communities and the United Nations, London 1998.
tory, implementation of the acquis has been suspended in the northern part of the island
dominated by Turkish Cypriots. It is a result of the unsettled Cyprus question as well as
the Turkish Cypriot unilateral declaration of independence. So far only Turkey has offi-
cially recognized a political entity proclaimed by them in 1983, namely the Turkish Re-
public of Northern Cyprus. As regards that, the EEC/EU has condemned unilateral
proclamation of the Turkish Cypriot state since then.
The most important question is whether EU policy towards Turkish Cypriots has
undergone any important modifications since the failure of the so-called Annan Plan in
April 2004. Turkish Cypriot ‘Yes’expressed in the referendum of 2004 forced the EU to
modify its policy towards this community. Therefore the main aim of this article is to
identify change or continuity within EU policy towards Turkish Cypriots. A compara-
tive approach based on an analysis of the EEC/EU official documents published before
and after April 2004 meets best the criterion.
I. The EEC/EU and Its Policy Towards TC before 2004: Legal Basis and Practice
Cyprus became independent on 16 August 1960. According to the Constitution of
the Republic of Cyprus of 1960, “the Greek Community comprises all citizens of the
Republic who are of Greek origin and whose mother tongue is Greek or who share the
Greek cultural traditions or who are members of the Greek-Orthodox Church” and “the
Turkish community comprises all citizens of the Republic who are of Turkish origin
and whose mother tongue is Turkish or who share the Turkish cultural traditions or who
are Moslems.”3 In the same year the census was conducted. The Department of Statis-
tics and Research reported on its findings – the island’s population was 573,566 people,
442,138 (77.1%) of whom were Greek Cypriots and 104,320 (18.2%) Turkish Cypri-
ots.4
The new state faced political unrest from the very beginning. None of two Cypriot
communities was satisfied with constitutional provisions and therefore both intended to
revise the constitution. Amendments proposed by then President Makarios in Novem-
ber 1963, often referred to as ‘The 13 Points,’ led to intercommunal violence. As a re-
sult, representatives of Turkish Cypriots resigned from all political functions what
amounted to de facto disintegration of the Republic. For this reason Turkish Cypriots
claim that the Cyprus question dates back to the 1963 events.5
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3 Draft Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, “Journal of Cyprus Studies” 1999, Vol. 14/15.
More on the 1960 treaties: The 1960 Treaties on Cyprus and Selected Subsequent Acts, N. D. Macris
(ed.), Mannheim 2003.
4 Report of 27 April 1992 on the Demographic Structure of the Cypriot Communities For Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Nicosia 2000, p. 17.
5 Selected words of former Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaº convey this opinion best: “Over
the years, Greek Cypriots have based their arguments on the false allegation that Turkish Cypriots re-
volted against the government in 1963. Consequently Greek Cypriots hastened to declare the Consti-
tution ‘dead and buried,’ thus abrogating all the constitutional and human rights of Turkish Cypriots,
merely offering them their co-partners minority rights in a Greek Cypriot Republic. They trampled on
and amended those parts of the Constitution which suited their criminal interests, relying on the irrele-
vant principle of the doctrine of necessity. Constitutionally they had no warrant to amend the Consti-
The first documents of the European Economic Community related to the Cyprus
question were published in the 1970’s. Then it was a completely external affair as none
of directly involved countries belonged to EEC. Although Greece, the Republic of Cy-
prus and Turkey were associated with the EEC at that time, the Community was not de-
termined to solve the problem at any price and restricted itself to recommendations and
resolutions. In practice the EEC did not attempt to engage in political activity of the
United Nations, the United Kingdom or the United States, however, it supported all ini-
tiatives leading to a comprehensive and lasting solution.
The EEC maintained relations with representatives of both sides or at least declared
such intention. There are a few documents which prove such claim, for example, Reso-
lution of 4 July 1973 on cooperation and contacts between the European Parliament and
the House of Representatives of Cyprus. The European Parliament, welcoming the en-
try into force of the Agreement of Association between the Republic of Cyprus and the
EEC, underlined need for closer parliamentary cooperation with the Cypriot House of
Representatives. According to paragraph 3, members of the Parliament proposed that
“the delegation of the House of Representatives of Cyprus shall consist of seven mem-
bers, of whom five shall represent the Greek Cypriot community and two the Turkish
Cypriot Community.”6
This way the European Parliament tried to avoid the situation in which the whole
Cypriot delegation would have consisted only of Greek Cypriots. It should be empha-
sized that representatives of Turkish Cypriots had been boycotting works of the House
of Representatives and other political institutions since 1963.7 As a result, the Turkish
Cypriot community was not represented in the parliament and Greek Cypriots could
have taken the advantage of the situation. However, the European Parliament did not in-
tend to let Turkish Cypriots block potential parliamentarian cooperation in the future
and that is why paragraph 7 was inserted into the resolution. It read as follows: “The
above arrangements shall be implemented as from 1 November 1973, should a consti-
tutional agreement be reached between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot commu-
nities. In the event that such an agreement is not reached before that date the question of
parliamentary contacts shall be reviewed by the European Parliament and the House of
Representatives of Cyprus at that time with a view to implementing informal arrange-
ments as early as possible equivalent to those detailed above.”8 As there was no prog-
ress in bilateral talks at that time, the EEC introduced a substitute solution which
enabled it to maintain relations only with a group of Cypriot parliamentarians domi-
nated by Greek Cypriot MP’s.
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tution in the absence from parliament of Turkish Cypriot members.” See: R. R. Denktaº, The Cyprus
Problem: What It Is – How Can It Be Solved?, Nicosia 2004, p. 9.
6 Resolution of 4 July 1973 on Cooperation and Contacts between the European Parliament and
the House of Representatives of Cyprus, in: European Stand on the Cyprus Problem. Resolutions
Adopted by the European Union and the Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of Ministers of
the Council of Europe, Nicosia 2003, p. 8.
7 Z. Stavrinides, The Cyprus Conflict: National Identity and Statehood, Nicosia 1999, p. 5.
8 Resolution of 4 July 1973 on Cooperation and Contacts between the European Parliament and
the House of Representatives of Cyprus, op. cit.
The situation underwent a significant change after the events of 1974. An unsuc-
cessful Greek coup d’etat gave Turkey an opportunity to intervene in the name of pro-
tection of Turkish Cypriots. Formal and legal evaluation of the Turkish military
operation still stirs up controversies on both sides, however, the EEC representatives
did not express any doubts about its real aim and condemned it from the very beginning.
On 24 April 1975 the Joint Parliamentary Committee of the EEC-Turkey Association
adopted a resolution dedicated among others to the Cyprus question. The Community
reiterated its support “for any just and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem based on
the recognition of a sovereign, independent state and on the equality of rights of the is-
land’s two communities.”9 This way the EEC criticized Turkey and Turkish Cypriots
for continuation of military occupation as well as for actual and legal actions which
they had taken since August 1974 especially unilateral proclamation of the Turkish
Federative State of Cyprus of February 1975.10 However, it should be underlined that in
1975 the EEC considered Turkey as the side representing Turkish Cypriots.
Although according to Turkish Cypriots the declaration was not equal to proclama-
tion of independence, it was condemned by international community. Some analysts
claimed that it was the first step towards independence and creation of a separate Turk-
ish Cypriot state in northern part of Cyprus.11 However, it became a fact eight years
later after fruitless negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations. The Turkish
Cypriot side did not suppress the truth that lack of progress during the negotiations
would result in a formal declaration of independence in order to secure its vital inter-
ests, namely security and steady development. For this reason on 15 November 1983
the Turkish Cypriot National Assembly officially declared independence and procla-
mation of the Turkish Cypriot state under the name the Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus (TRNC).12 The European Parliament followed the UN Security Council and its
reaction was quick and firm. In the resolution of 17 November 1983 the EP called on
“all the parties concerned to support the initiative of the UN Secretary General” and in-
vited “the Council of Ministers to take all the necessary measures so that this action by
the Turkish Cypriot sector remains null and void.”13 In practice such reaction was
amounted to informal isolation of the new political entity on Cyprus. Thanks to that
EEC member states did not intend to maintain any political or economic relations with
the TRNC.
As regards the informal isolation, the following years appeared to be very difficult
for Turkish Cypriots. They were completely dependent on financial aid from Turkey,
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9 Resolution of 24 April 1975 on the Recommendations of the Joint Parliamentary Committee of
the EEC-Turkey Association Adopted in Copenhagen on 24 April 1975, in: European Stand on the Cy-
prus Problem…
10 J. Reddaway, Burdened with Cyprus: The British Connection, Nicosia 2001, p. 182.
11 See: C. Palley, An International Relations Debacle: the UN Secretary-General’s Mission of
Good Offices in Cyprus 1999–2004, Portland 2005, pp. 44–45; A. Theophanous, Cyprus, the Euro-
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Europe: the Long Way Back, Mannheim–Möhnesee 2003, p. 143.
12 See: North Cyprus: Almanack, Nicosia 1987, pp. 1–51.
13 Resolution of the European Parliament of 17 November 1983 on the ‘Declaration of Independ-
ence’ by the Turkish Cypriot sector of Cyprus, in: European Stand on the Cyprus Problem…, p. 34.
however, they managed to maintain very limited trade relations with a few EEC coun-
tries especially the United Kingdom. Unfortunately, it ended when the European Court
of Justice “found for the plaintiff and so, from 1994, virtually all direct trade between
north Cyprus and its natural market in the EU ceased. This was known to Turkish Cyp-
riots as ‘the embargo’ and was treated as if the European Union had imposed sanctions
on the TRNC.”14 It should be noted that in the case of trade almost nothing has changed
for Turkish Cypriots since 1994 and they are still forced to face the same problems due
to the lack of international recognition.
In the 80’s and the 90’s the European Parliament tended to criticize Turkish Cypriot
leader Rauf Denktaº for lack of progress during bilateral talks or dialogue under the
auspices of the United Nations. In the resolution of 15 March 1990 members of the EP
expressed a strong conviction that “the overwhelming majority of both Turkish and
Greek Cypriots desire a peaceful and united Cyprus which guarantees the political,
civil and human rights to ALL Cypriots”15. In the same document the EP condemned
the actions of Rauf Denktaº and underlined that it did not identified them with the Turk-
ish Cypriot community: “Condemning the actions of Mr. Denktaº to attempt to alter the
Secretary General’s mandate which led to the collapse of the UN initiative of Wednes-
day 28 February; Believing that the vast majority of Turkish Cypriots also deplore the
spoiling tactics of Mr. Denktaº […].”16 Nowadays it is clear that the EEC adopted such
a new policy towards Turkish Cypriots in order to support the opposition. European
politicians tended to conceive Rauf Denktaº as the main obstacle on the way to a rap-
prochement between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Any negative stances could
have discouraged members of the Turkish Cypriot community from opposing the offi-
cial policy of their top representatives. For obvious reasons, Rauf Denktaº was trying to
strengthen his political position thanks to external threats or external political pressure.
Any declarations similar to those of the EP did not fit such tactics.
On 4 July 1990 the Republic of Cyprus submitted its application for membership of
the EEC. Although there was no agreement among EEC member states whether the di-
vided island should join the Community, participation in European integration was pre-
sented as an important measure to reunite two Cypriot communities. Membership in
return for a comprehensive solution seemed to be the best option at that time. Therefore
the European Commission, in its opinion on the application by the Republic of Cyprus
for membership of 30 June 1993, clearly stated that “the result of Cyprus’s accession to
the Community would be increased security and prosperity and that it would help bring
the two communities on the island closer together.”17 On these grounds Turkish Cypri-
ots together with Greek Cypriots were to participate in European integration and derive
benefits of it, although in practice the application was submitted only by Greek Cypri-
ots, namely the government of the Republic of Cyprus. The perspective of the end of
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15 Resolution of the European Parliament of 15 March 1990 on the Current Cyprus Situation, in:
The Cyprus Question, Nicosia 2003, p. 127.
16 Ibidem.
17 Commission Opinion on the Application by the Republic of Cyprus for Membership of 30 June
1993, in: European Stand on the Cyprus Problem…
economic and political isolation of North Cyprus within the European Union was also
aimed at Rauf Denktaº who opposed such a plan or, more precisely, any EU-Cyprus ac-
cession talks based on the Greek Cypriot application of 4 July 1990. According to the
Turkish Cypriot leader, the Greek Cypriot priority was membership of the EU and not
a solution of the Cyprus question based on a bi-zonal and bi-communal federal state. He
believed that after the accession Greek Cypriots were to take full advantage of EU
membership to weaken the Turkish Cypriot position or even banish them from the is-
land: “No one can drag us by force of arms into the EU. We are not going to enter with-
out our status and a divided Cyprus will enter with all its problems. Greek Cypriots will
start immediately saying that Turkey is now in occupation of an EU territory, therefore
help me, as the government of Cyprus which you have recognized for so long to eject
Turkey from Cyprus, to send back my refugees to their own properties, therefore to up-
root Turkish Cypriots for the fourth time in 40 years. This will be a continuous problem
for the EU.”18 For this reason Rauf Denktaº was rejecting any invitations to join up rep-
resentatives of Turkish Cypriots with the official Cypriot negotiation team during the
accession talks.
On 6 March 1995 the General Affairs Council reconsidered the Cypriot application
for membership of the EU. Pauline Green pointed out that “this meeting was also im-
portant because it articulated the case for the support that the EU would have available
for the economy of the north of the island, and was explicit that this would be for the
Turkish Cypriots community. The Council was clear that the Turkish Cypriot commu-
nity needed to understand the full advantages available to it upon EU accession more
clearly, and went on to urge the other institutions of the EU to improve and increase
their links with the Turkish Cypriot community.”19 Intentions of the EU were clear, yet
its message could not reach Turkish Cypriots due to the informal isolation. As the Turk-
ish Cypriot community had only limited access to news on European integration, the
governmental interpretation of various EU issues was the only source of information.
Obviously, the official interpretation was not pro-European and therefore the Turkish
Cypriot authorities did not welcome any EU attempt to persuade Turkish Cypriots of
advantages related to EU membership.
Because any bilateral agreement was unlikely to be reached as long as Rauf Denktaº
was in office, the EU decided to increase political as well as financial support for the
Turkish Cypriot opposition political parties. It became obvious that there would be no
progress in the frame of bilateral talks as long as Rauf Denktaº was in power in North
Cyprus. The final decision was made during spring 2003 after the Turkish Cypriot
leader had rejected another version of the Annan plan and had decided to end talks un-
der the auspices of the UN. In spite of that, Cyprus was to join the EU on 1 May 2004
and such step meant that the de facto divided island would join the EU – a scenario
which was the least desirable among EU member states. On account of these develop-
ments, in May 2003 “the EU proposed a package of measures to aid the Turkish Cypri-
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pp. 19–20.
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ots. It promised 12 million euros.”20 This way the EU intended to bypass the Turkish
Cypriot government and to transfer the money directly into accounts of three munici-
palities, namely Nicosia, Famagusta and Kyrenia. “It served to boost the reputation and
popularity of the newly elected left-wing mayors of those three major municipalities.
The impact of these resources on their popularity was expected to have its effect on the
fortunes of the left-wing political parties in the important December 2003 parliamen-
tary elections.”21 The Republican Turkish Party (CTP) of Mehmet Ali Talat was to be-
come the main beneficiary of the new EU approach, although the Turkish Cypriot
government did it best to block the controversial financial aid which it called even
a bribery. After Mehmet Ali Talat had been elected as a new prime minister, participation
of Turkish Cypriots in European integration from 1 May 2004 became more probable.
Notwithstanding the results of the December 2003 elections, EU politicians knew
that the key to solution was to convince the Turkish government. Turkey supported the
EU in its actions aiming at the change of government in North Cyprus. The position of
the new government, dominated by AKP, was decisive. Lack of mutual understanding
and trust between the new government and Rauf Denktaº resulted in a significant politi-
cal change on the island. Unquestionably no Turkish Cypriot leader could remain in
power without the unconditional support of Turkey.
In 2002 it became obvious that the Cyprus question could be the main obstacle on
the Turkish way to EU membership and could delay the opening of accession negotia-
tions. For this reason Turkey cooperated with the United Nations as well as the Euro-
pean Union to settle the dispute in April 2004. The final version of the Annan plan,
which had been compiled in Bürgenstock in the end of March, was to be accepted in si-
multaneous referenda by members of both Cypriot communities.22 Both Greek Cypri-
ots and Turkish Cypriots had an opportunity to decide directly about their future for the
first time in history. Top EU politicians and UN officers were convinced that Cypriots
intended to take advantage of the situation Nevertheless, the outcome of the referenda
of 24 April 2004 dispelled their illusions.
II. After the Failure of the Annan Plan: Upgrading Relations with TC?
Surprisingly Greek Cypriots were those who decided to turn down the proposal and
this way they left Turkish Cypriots outside the European Union. 75.83 per cent of
Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan while 64.91 per cent of Turkish Cypriots voted
in favour of the agreement.23 The European Union was forced to accept new political
circumstances on the island.
Although Turkish Cypriots could not be blamed for the fiasco of the Annan Plan, the
European Union have not considered any form of recognition of the TRNC. Thus its of-
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ficial position concerning the Cyprus question remains unchanged. Some EU politi-
cians as well as the Commission openly supported Turkish Cypriots and called to lift
embargoes in return for their conciliatory gesture, however, those declarations did not
lead to any political steps. Here are a few examples:
– UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw: “I am glad that the Turkish Cypriot community
has voted so clearly for the settlement. I understand very well their wish to end their
isolation in the world. […] I want them to know that this remains our goal too, and
that we will continue to work for its ultimate realisation;”24
– the European Commission’s statement of 24 April 2004: “A unique opportunity to
bring about a solution to the long-lasting Cyprus issue has been missed. The Euro-
pean Commission would like to warmly congratulate Turkish Cypriots for their ‘Yes’
vote. This signals a clear desire of the community to resolve the island’s problem.
The Commission is ready to consider ways of further promoting economic develop-
ment of the northern part of Cyprus;”25
– EU’s Commissioner for Enlargement Günter Verheugen: “What we will seriously
consider now is finding a way to end the economic isolation of Turkish Cypriots.”26
Nevertheless, one can observe some significant changes in bilateral relations be-
tween the EU and the Turkish Cypriot community. Top EU politicians or representa-
tives of EU member states have been meeting Turkish Cypriot representatives in North
Cyprus since April 2004. Among them were European socialist MP’s (February 2005),
EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn (May 2005), Foreign Minister of Luxem-
bourg Nicholas Schmit (May 2005), President of the European Parliament Josep Borell
(October 2005), and British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw (January 2006).
Undoubtedly, such meetings in North Cyprus would have been impossible before
the referenda. Besides, in 2005 the Commission’s Directorate General for Enlargement
has created a special unit for the Turkish Cypriot community called the Task Force
Turkish Cypriot community and headed by Leopold Maurer.27
The fiasco of the Annan Plan was the last thing the EU needed even though it was
well prepared for such a scenario. According to Protocol 10 article 1 of the Treaty of
Accession of 16 March 2003, “the application of the acquis shall be suspended in those
areas of the Republic of Cyprus in which the Government of the Republic of Cyprus
does not exercise effective control.”28 At the same time the parties agreed that “nothing
in this Protocol shall preclude measures with a view to promoting the economic devel-
opment of the areas referred to in Article 1.”29 This way the European Union can pro-
vide Turkish Cypriots with financial assistance after the fiasco of the Annan Plan.
74 Przemys³aw Osiewicz
24 BBC, 24 April 2004.
25 Commission Statement Following the Outcome of the Referendum in Cyprus, IP/04/537,
26.04.2004.
26 I. Black, H. Smith, EU to Reward Turkish Cypriots, “The Guardian,” 26 April 2004.
27 The Commission Sets Up Special Unit for Turkish Cypriots, “Kýbrýs,” February 2005.




When the Republic of Cyprus joined the EU on 1 May 2004, the whole Cypriot terri-
tory became de iure EU territory, however, the application of the acquis was suspended
in its northern part. Ironically, Turkish Cypriots became EU citizens who in practice
were left outside the EU.30 Moreover, presence of Greek Cypriot representatives in all
EU institutions upset the balance of power on the island. Thanks to that the Greek Cyp-
riot community can put pressure on Turkey and Turkish Cypriots in the frame of EU ex-
ternal relations. As a consequence, the European Union is not impartial in case of the
Cyprus question anymore. Even though the Community always supported the Greek
Cypriot side, it did it best to remain neutral at least in theory. Such attitude to the Cyprus
dispute is not possible any longer as one of the parties is an EU member and has its rep-
resentatives in EU institutions.
On 29 April 2004 the Council of the European Union adopted regulation
No 866/2004 on a regime under article 2 of Protocol 10 to the Act of Accession.31 The
Council stated in point 2 that “the application of the acquis upon accession has therefore
been suspended pursuant to article 1 of Protocol 10, in the areas of the Republic of Cy-
prus in which the government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective
control.”32 At the same time the Council confirmed in point 5 that “article 3 of Protocol
10 explicitly states that measures promoting economic development in the above-
mentioned areas are not precluded by the suspension of the acquis. This regulation is to
facilitate trade and other links between the abovementioned areas and those areas in
which the Government of the Republic of Cyprus exercises effective control, whilst en-
suring that appropriate standards of protection are maintained as set out above.”33 Since
then the European Union has continued political isolation of northern part of Cyprus,
but not in economic terms. It supports economic development of the Turkish Cypriot
community in order to make up differences in economic growth on both sides of the
Green Line.
On the basis of Protocol 10, the EU decided to provide the Turkish Cypriot commu-
nity with financial assistance. Some analysts claimed that it was a kind of reward for
Turkish Cypriots, because they backed the Annan Plan. As a matter of fact, the funds
were earmarked for the northern part of Cyprus in the event of a settlement. On 26 April
2004 the Council recommended that these funds should be used to put an end to the iso-
lation of the Turkish Cypriot community. In the budget of 2005 the Commission allo-
cated almost 27 million euro to Turkish Cypriots within the pre-accession strategy.34
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The financial assistance for Turkish Cypriots was blocked for a long time by the
Greek Cypriot side. Officially it claimed that these funds could strengthen the position
of the unrecognized Turkish Cypriot authorities. It took almost two years to break the
deadlock. On 27 February 2006 the Council adopted regulation No 389 (2006) estab-
lishing an instrument of financial support for encouraging the economic development
of the Turkish Cypriot community. The overall objective of the regulation is that the
Community “shall provide assistance to facilitate the reunification of Cyprus by en-
couraging the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot community with particular
emphasis on the economic integration of the island, on improving contacts between the
two communities and with the EU, and on preparation on the acquis communautaire.”35
Other main objectives of the assistance are:
– the promotion of social and economic development;
– the development and restructuring of infrastructure;
– reconciliation, confidence building measures and support to civil society;
– bringing the Turkish Cypriot community closer to the Union;
– preparation of legal texts aligned with the acquis;
– preparation for implementation of the acquis.36
As regards the administration of the financial assistance, the Commission is respon-
sible for this task. In total 259 million euro was allocated for the programme which is to
be implemented over five years. “Up to July 2008, contracts have been signed for about
20 per cent of the 259 million available. It is expected that contracts will be signed
for the rest by the end of 2009. Most of the contracts should be completed by the end
of 2011.”37
The financial assistance is a very interesting example how the European Union can
support preparations for future reunification. Undoubtedly, money invested in the eco-
nomic development of the Turkish Cypriot community is money well invested. This
way the EU can restrain the widening economic gap between both Cypriot communi-
ties in order to avoid, for example, the situation observed in Germany after the reunifi-
cation in 1990.
Moreover, after April 2004 the European Union also presented proposals on special
conditions for trade with those areas of the Republic of Cyprus in which the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control. The Commission
presented a proposal for such a Council regulation on 7 July 2004. Article 1 read as fol-
lows: “Products that, within the meaning of Articles 23 and 24 of Council regulation
No 2913/92, originate in the Areas and are transported directly there from, may be re-
leased for free circulation into the customs territory of the Community with exemption
from customs duties and charges having equivalent effect within the limits of annual
tariff quotas fixed in accordance with Article 4, provided that they are accompanied by
76 Przemys³aw Osiewicz
35 Council Regulation (EC) No 389/2006 of 27 February 2006 Establishing an Instrument of Fi-
nancial Support for Encouraging the Economic Development of the Turkish Cypriot Community and
Amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2667/2000 on the European Agency for Reconstruction.
36 Ibidem.
37 Turkish Cypriot community, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/turkish_cypriot_community/in-
dex_en.htm (30.07.2008).
the document referred to in Article 2(2) and provided that they are not eligible for ex-
port refunds or intervention measures. This is without prejudice to indirect taxes due on
importation.”38 Besides, the Commission suggested opening of Turkish Cypriot ports
and airports which have been closed to direct international trade and travel since 1974.
Undoubtedly, if such a regulation was adopted by the Council, it would amount to the
end of economic isolation of northern Cyprus. Although it has not been adopted yet due
to the Greek Cypriot backlash and nothing indicates that this situation will change in the
nearest future, the Commission proposal should be judged an example of good will and
a reward for Turkish Cypriots.
Conclusions
The attitude of the European Union towards Turkish Cypriots has undergone some
significant changes since April 2004, however, those changes have not influenced its
position on the Cyprus question. The European Union has not recognized the Turkish
Cypriot state and it does not intend to do that in the future. It remains one of the main
principles within integration policy conceptual framework. For that reason the EU
maintains official relations only with the Republic of Cyprus and prefers a comprehen-
sive solution based on a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation.
The main changes within the EU’s attitude towards Turkish Cypriots can be divided
into two groups. The political group includes direct meetings between top EU and
Turkish Cypriot representatives even in the Turkish Cypriot controlled part of the is-
land. Such steps would have been impossible before the referenda, because they might
have been interpreted as de facto recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cy-
prus. Besides, influential politicians from various EU member states often declare sup-
port for Turkish Cypriots and emphasize their potential constructive role in European
integration. Probably this way the EU intends to make certain that the Turkish Cypriot
community will also opt for a federal solution in the future.
As regards economic changes, the most significant one is the financial assistance to
facilitate the reunification of Cyprus by encouraging the economic development of the
Turkish Cypriot community. So far the EU has allocated more than 259 million euro for
this purpose. Moreover, the EU presented proposals on special conditions for trade with
those areas of the Republic of Cyprus in which the Government of the Republic of Cy-
prus does not exercise effective control. So far these proposals have been blocked by
Greek Cypriots. Nevertheless, once they are adopted, they will amount to the end of
economic isolation of Turkish Cypriots.
The most important question is whether all above changes will help to solve the Cy-
prus dispute in the nearest future. According to David Hannay, “much will depend on
the prospects for Turkish accession to the EU. If Turkey’s candidature prospers, and so
the reality of Turkish accession comes closer, a solution to the Cyprus problem will be-
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come a necessity; and it is difficult to see any solution straying far away from the Annan
Plan which has been so widely endorsed.”39 Undoubtedly, the European Union will
support any comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus dispute if it enables Turkish Cyp-
riots to take an active part in European integration. The Cyprus question is constructive
neither for both Cypriot communities nor for the European Union.
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